COMMENTS
RESENTENCING DEFENDANTS AND THE PROTECTION
AGAINST MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT
MICHAEL P.

Dosst

It has been said that trouble seldom comes singly for the criminal
defendant.1 At trial she is often faced with a number of separate criminal charges. When such a defendant is convicted and sentenced, an
appeal may result in the reversal of some but not all of the counts.
The sentences attached to the reversed counts necessarily fail as well.
Under these circumstances, the Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy2 does not preclude vacating the
sentences on the remaining counts and remanding the case to the trial
court for resentencing-expressly allowing for an increase of the
sentences on the affirmed counts.' Thus, in United States v.
t B.A. 1982, University of Oregon; J.D. Candidate, 1986, University of Pennsylvania. The author wrote this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
' See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-4.5 commentary at 292 (1980).
2 "[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .

.

. ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause is

applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 793-96 (1969).
1 See United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 203-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 180 (1984); McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 879 (1982); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 838 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 816 (1981); United States v. Moore, 710 F.2d 270, 270-71 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 497 (1983); United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 862 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 211 (1984); United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 706-07
(7th Cir. 1983).
Remanding for harsher sentencing following the reversal of certain counts has
arisen in three distinct settings. In Mourad, the Second Circuit vacated sentences under
criminal conspiracy counts because the offenses merged with the defendantes "continuing criminal enterprise" conviction. See Mourad, 729 F.2d at 202. Offenses "merge"
when it is determined that the legislature did not intend to allow for separate convictions and punishment-for instance if one offense is a lesser included offense of the
other, or perhaps when the offenses are committed during the same criminal transaction. In Mourad the court remanded the "continuing criminal enterprise" conviction
and stated that "the district court may consider whether to increase the . . . sentence."
Id. at 204.
In United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981), the defendant was originally sentenced to twenty years imprisonment under a
(1409)
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Moore" the defendant, after receiving consecutive sentences of fifteen
and twenty-five years imprisonment for bank robbery and kidnapping
convictions, was resentenced to forty years on the kidnapping conviction
alone after the bank robbery charge was held improper on appeal. 5
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether increasing sentences on remaining valid counts is barred by the double
jeopardy clause.6 Prior to the Court's opinion in United States v.
DiFrancesco,7 however, it was generally assumed in the federal courts
that the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for
the same offense prohibited such an increase in sentence. 8
The sharp change in opinion by the courts of appeals9 after the
federal "enhancement statute" for using a gun to commit a felony. See id. at 943.
Enhancement statutes allow for additional punishment when an underlying offense includes certain aggravating circumstances. After the defendant's initial conviction and
sentencing, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to provide for enhancement when "the predicate felony statute contain[ed] its own enhancement provision." Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 404 (1980). The Third Circuit then vacated not only the improper enhancement sentence, but also the sentence on the
underlying felony conviction. The court held that on remand the trial judge was free to
impose a greater sentence on the remaining conviction. See United States v. Busic, 639
F.2d at 953.
Finally, in Pinto the defendant was convicted of bank robbery and of making false
representations to a bank. Such charges are independent-they neither merge nor depend on the existence of a predicate offense. Pinto had been sentenced to five years
imprisonment on the bank robbery charge and five years probation on the false representations charge. Pinto, 646 F.2d at 834. The Third Circuit held that Pinto's actions
did not fall within the bank robbery statute and reversed the conviction. See id. at 837.
The court affirmed the other conviction and, following Busic, remanded for resentencing. See id. at 838. Given this second chance, the trial court imposed a two-year prison
term plus a $5000 fine. See United States v. Pinto, No. 79-00133 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2,
1981), affd, 681 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.) (unpublished judgment order), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 879 (1982).
4 710 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 497 (1983).
5 See id. at 270.
' See United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982).
7 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
1 See United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 706 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 309 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); United States v. DiFrancesco,
604 F.2d 769, 783-85 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 117 (1980); United States v.
Fredenburgh, 602 F.2d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Turner, 518 F.2d
14, 16 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 619 (3d'Cir. 1970);
United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368, 369 (2d Cir. 1966).
1 This judicial shift is best illustrated through a pair of Third Circuit opinions. In
United States v. Fredenburgh, 602 F.2d 1143 (3d Cir. 1979), the court stated that
"[a]dded punishment under a valid sentence simply because the defendant has successfully shown the invalidity of the sentence under another count is a plain violation of the [double jeopardy clause]. It may not
be justified because the sentencing judge would have imposed the higher
penalty if he had been aware of the invalidity of the sentence imposed on
the other counts."
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issuance of DiFrancescoresults from a misunderstanding of the constitutional values that underlie the prohibition of multiple punishment
and inform the scope of its protections. This Comment argues that the
protection against multiple punishment serves two purposes. First, it
restricts judicial power to determine the initial punishment and to increase the punishment at a later time. Second, the multiple punishment
bar protects the defendant's interest in finality. That is, it respects the
defendant's interest in having the ordeal of sentencing over once and for
all to avoid the strain of uncertainty and delay.
Part I of this Comment describes the development of the double
jeopardy clause and the protection against multiple punishment. Part II
concludes that increasing sentences on surviving counts of a multicount
conviction presents a multiple punishment issue. Part III analyzes the
scope of the multiple punishment bar as informed by the values that
underlie the rule and concludes that the rule forbids increased sentences
on remand when the underlying conviction is undisturbed.
I.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT BAR:

A

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Protection from twice being placed in jeopardy represents "one of
the oldest ideas found in western civilization." 1 Over 2000 years ago
Demosthenes declared, "[T]he laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue . . . ."I' Centuries later Blackstone repeated,
"lIt is a] universal maxim of the common law of England that no man
is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same
offense." 12 Yet despite its age the protection from double jeopardy is
Id. at 1148 (quoting United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir. 1970)).
Two years later the court found that
[t]there is nothing in the history or the policies of the Double Jeopardy
Clause that justifies the denial of resentencing when the sentence has been
spread erroneously over counts that have been declared invalid. On the
other hand, resentencing under such circumstances should reduce the possibility of disparate and irrational sentencing.
United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 947-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918
(1981); see also cases cited supra note 3.
" Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). "The constitutional provision had its origin in the three common-law pleas of autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict, and pardon. These three pleas prevented the retrial of a person who
had previously been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned for the same offense." United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978). For a history of double jeopardy protections, see
M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-15 (1969); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-37 (1969).
12 1 DEMOSTHENES 589 (j. Vance trans. 1962), quoted in United States v. Jen-

kins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
Is 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
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"one of the least understood . . . provisions of the Bill of Rights."1

The wording of the double jeopardy clause is short and obscure,
but it has grown to embody no fewer than three distinct constitutional
protections. The Supreme Court's "favorite saying about double jeopardy" 14 goes as follows: "It protects against a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." 15 Thus, if resentencing defendants to
increased punishment is to be barred by the double jeopardy clause, the
prohibition must be found within this trio of protections. Although a
strong argument can be made that resentencing to harsher punishment
is barred by the protection against a second prosecution following acquittal, 6 this Comment deals exclusively with the protection against
11 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"That its application has not proved to be facile or routine is demonstrated by acknowledged changes in direction or in emphasis." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117, 127 (1980) (citations omitted).
14 Westen, The Three Faces of DoubleJeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1062 (1980).
15 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted); accord
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 & n.10 (1980).
The general purposes underlying the double jeopardy clause were described by the
Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957):
The underlying idea . . . is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 187-88.
1' In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), the Supreme Court held that if
the legislature has divided an offense into separate degrees of seriousness, then a conviction for a lesser degree acts as an implicit acquittal of all greater degrees. See id. at 190.
Thus, a conviction for second degree murder acts as an acquittal for the charge of first
degree murder. Once acquitted, the defendant can never be retried or convicted for the
same offense. See id.
The implicit acquittal argument is easily adapted to sentencing decisions: When a
particular sentence is chosen from a range of authorized penalties, it is argued that
"'the judge or jury is implicitly "acquitting" the defendant of a greater penalty, just as
the jury in Green implicitly acquitted . . .the accused of a greater degree of the same
offense.'" North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 728 n.1 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 635 (1965)).
In Pearce Justice Harlan also argued that the Green rationale applied equally to
sentencing decisions:
In each instance, the defendant was once subjected to the risk of receiving
a maximum punishment, but it was determined by legal process that he
should receive only a specified punishment less than the maximum. ...
[Tihe concept . . .of an 'implicit acquittal' of the greater offense . ..
applies equally to the greater sentence: in each case it was determined at
the former trial that the defendant or his offense was of a certain limited
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multiple punishment.

degree of 'badness' or gravity only, and therefore merited only a certain
limited punishment.
Id. at 746 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
The consequence of a particular sentence acting as an implicit acquittal of all harsher
sentences would be that once a sentence is imposed it could not later be increased without violating the double jeopardy clause.
The implicit acquittal argument for sentencing decisions has, however, been explicitly rejected by the Court. In United States v. DiFrancesco, 440 U.S. 117 (1980),
the Court upheld a statute providing for appeals of sentences by the government under
specific circumstances. See id. at 142-43. The Court stated that a sentence does not
have the "qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal," id. at 134, and
thus "the imposition of sentence does not operate as an implied acquittal of any greater
sentence." Id. at 136 n.14.
Yet the implicit acquittal argument for sentencing decisions is not dead. The Court
resurrected it in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), during the same term as
DiFrancesco.In Bullington the Court held that, because Missouri's capital sentencing
procedure sufficiently resembled a trial of guilt or innocence, a jury sentence of life
imprisonment in that state served as an acquittal of "'whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence.'" Id. at 445 (1981) (quoting State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason,
594 S.W.2d 908, 922 (Mo. 1980) (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting)). Thus, when a sentencing procedure sufficiently resembles a trial, the sentence imposed will act as an implicit
acquittal of all greater sentences.
In Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305 (1984), the Court described three characteristics of a capital sentencing procedure that made it "sufficiently" like a trial on guilt
or innocence to warrant double jeopardy protections. First, the discretion of the sentencing judge was limited-the only two sentencing options were death and life imprisonment. See id. at 2310. Second, the judge was required to make findings, pursuant to
statutory standards, with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the
aggravating circumstances had to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Finally,
the sentencing hearing provided an opportunity to submit additional evidence and present arguments. See id.
Sentencing guideline systems, such as the recently enacted Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 1987 (to
be codified primarily in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), may allow for an
expansion of the Bullington "implicit acquittal" reasoning into areas other than capital
sentencing procedures. The Sentencing Reform Act will require in each case a determination of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved in the particular offense, see id. at 2020 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)), as well as the characteristics of the particular defendant, see id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)). Once
such a determination is made, the court will be guided to the specific range and type of
sentence to impose. See id. at 2019 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)).
The information required for these sentencing decisions will be obtained from the
trial record, from a sentencing hearing, and from a probation officer's presentence report. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1), (c)(1). The sentencing hearing will provide an
opportunity for both the government and the defendant to comment on the probation
officer's findings in the presentence report and to urge their own views of the proper
sentence applicable to the case. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). Thus, sentencing procedures under the new Federal Sentencing Reform Act will closely resemble the capital
sentencing procedures described in Bullington and Rumsey.
The question remains, however, whether the Court will ever be willing to extend
this reasoning to noncapital sentencing procedures. In the Bullington opinion the Court
did not mention the uniqueness of the death sentence as a rationale for its holding. Yet
the unique nature of the death penalty often underlies the Court's reasoning in capital
cases, even if it is not stated. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
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The Supreme Court has considered only a handful of cases involving the application of the multiple punishment bar to alterations of
original sentences. In Ex parte Lange17 the Court held that the defendant could not be resentenced after having satisfied one of the authorized punishments for his offense." The sentencing judge in Lange was
barred by the protection against multiple punishment from imposing a
new sentence that in effect would have exceeded the maximum sentence
allowed by the relevant statute.' 9
In Bozza v. United States" the Court held that if the initial sentence is lower than the statutory minimum it may be corrected without
breaching the multiple punishment bar even though the correction results in increased punishment. 2 The Court distinguished this increase
in punishment from the situation in Lange by the fact that the sentencing court had no authority to impose the initial illegal sentence and
22
indeed was required by law to correct it.
North Carolina v. Pearce2 presented the question whether the
double jeopardy clause permits a court to sentence a defendant whose
initial conviction was vacated because of trial error to greater punishment following retrial. 24 The Court held that a necessary corollary to
the power to retry the defendant is the ability, "upon the defendant's
reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized."2 6
The new conviction and sentence did not constitute multiple punishment since "the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been
26
wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean."
Finally, in United States v. DiFrancesco27 the Court held that the
double jeopardy clause did not prohibit Congress from enacting a statute that provided for governmental appeals of sentences imposed upon
"dangerous special offenders ' 28 under specific circumstances.2 9 In deciding that the multiple punishment protection was not violated, the
Thus, the mere resemblance of noncapital sentencing guidelines to the procedures at
issue in Bullington might not persuade the Court to view a sentence imposed under
those guidelines as an implied acquittal of harsher sentences.
17 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
18 See id. at 176.
19 See id. at 175.
20 330 U.S. 160 (1947).
2' See id. at 165-67.
2 See id. at 167.
23 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
24 See id. at 719.
25 Id. at 720.
2S Id. at 721.
27 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
28 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a)-(g) (1982).
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982).
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Court found that the defendant had no legitimate expectations of the
finality of the initial sentence where "Congress has specifically pro' 30
vided that the sentence is subject to appeal.
Our understanding of the multiple punishment bar would be well
served if the holdings of these cases could be weaved together under one
coherent doctrine. It is more useful to develop the boundaries of the
multiple punishment protection to determine if resentencing defendants
on remand falls within these boundaries, than it is merely to determine
whether resentencing defendants is more similar to Lange than
DiFrancesco.
II.

SENTENCING IN MULTIPLE COUNT CONVICTIONS

In order to determine whether the multiple punishment bar prohibits increasing legal sentences on remand, it is important first to determine what is meant by "increased sentences" in the context of multicount convictions. A successful appeal of one of the counts will
generally result in a reduction of the aggregate sentence initially imposed, even after resentencing on the affirmed counts. In United States
v. Pinto,"1 for example, the defendant's initial sentence was five years
imprisonment on a bank robbery conviction and five years probation on
a conviction for making false representations to a bank. 2 After a reversal of the bank robbery conviction the defendant was resentenced on the
false representations offense to two years imprisonment and a $5000
fine. 3 The original aggregate sentence was thus reduced while the sentence on the particular offense was increased.
From these facts it could be argued that the defendant is not subjected to an increased punishment if the total punishment after resentencing does not exceed the original total sentence." If the defendants's

'0 DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.

at 139.
31 646 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981).
32 See id. at 834.
'3 United States v. Pinto, No. 79-00133 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1981), affd, 681 F.2d
810 (3d Cir.) (unpublished judgment order), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982).
14 Cf United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (government argued that, despite increased sentences on certain counts, the reduction in
sentence for the entire criminal transaction precluded a challenge based on the multiple
punishment bar). If the new sentence were to exceed the aggregate original sentence, a
strong argument could be made that the increase would violate the due process clause.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), holds that the due process clause requires that any increase in the aggregate sentence be based upon new objective information concerning conduct by the defendant and that the reasons for any increase "affirmatively appear." 395 U.S. at 726. These requirements are necessary to insure that
a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal is not deterred by a fear of vindictiveness
on the part of the sentencing judge. See id. at 725.
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"sentence" has not been increased following resentencing, then the punishment surely cannot be deemed multiple.
The argument that the defendant is not suffering increased punishment treats the aggregate sentence imposed in a multicount conviction as a general sentence for an entire criminal transaction rather than
as specific sentences for specific offenses." The assumption is that a
sentencing judge determines an aggregate sentence for the entire criminal event and splits this aggregate sentence among the specific counts of
conviction. 6
This argument certainly has a practical appeal. It cannot be
doubted that judges often determine sentences for specific counts with
an eye on a desired aggregate sentence.3 7 Indeed, the rationale for remanding sentences on the remaining counts is that the judge intended
the criminal behavior to be punished by the aggregate sentence and that
this intention was foiled by the reversal of one of the underlying counts
of conviction. 8 This was the position of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in United States v. Busics9 when it stated that the double
jeopardy clause does not bar increasing the sentence on the remaining
counts "when the sentence has been spread erroneously over counts that
have been declared invalid."'
Yet the view that a defendant is not suffering increased punishment when the aggregate sentence is lowered ignores the fact that
sentences are authorized only insofar as they result from a conviction
for the violation of a particular federal statute. As the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Henry," "[A] federal
'sentence' is not general or transactional. It is the specific consequence
of a specific federal statute. "42
A federal court's authority to impose a particular criminal punishment is derived solely from Congress's decision to prescribe certain
punishments for certain criminal behavior. 43 While it may seem artifi" See United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
See id.
'7 "Available evidence suggests that criminal sentencing decisions already are
based heavily upon actual offense behavior as distinguished from the formal offense of
conviction." Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 757
(1980).
" See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 707 & n.34 (7th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 947 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
39 639 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
36

40
41
42

Id. at 948.

709 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

Id. at 310.

4' See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) ("[T]he power to
define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those
found guilty of them . . . resides wholly with the Congress.") (citation omitted); Rum-
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cial to divide a criminal transaction into*separate counts, each punishable by a separate sentence, this is the structure imposed on the federal
courts by Congress. The federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984" supports this view of sentences by requiring the trial court to consider the
characteristics of "each offense for which a term of imprisonment is
' when determining sentences following multiple count
being imposed" 45
convictions.
Thus, although a defendant's aggregate sentence may be reduced
after resentencing, the punishment for a particular offense will still be
increased. The reduction of the aggregate sentence is the result of a
reversal of some of the original counts of conviction-"it is the lawful
result of a successful challenge to an illegal sentence." 4' 6 Multiple punishment analysis therefore must focus on a particular sentence imposed
for a specific offense. A defendant's "punishment" is increased whenever the sentence attached to a particular count is increased. The question remains, however, whether the multiple punishment bar protects a
defendant from such increases in punishment.
III.

RESENTENCING DEFENDANTS AND THE MULTIPLE
PUNISHMENT BAR

A.

The Scope of the Multiple Punishment Bar

The Supreme Court has often stated that the double jeopardy
clause protects a criminal defendant from multiple punishments for the
same offense,4 but the Court has been unclear on the proper scope of
this protection. At one time it was argued that the multiple punishment
bar contained an independent standard "for defining the existence of a
criminal offense and for establishing the maximum permissible sentence
for such an offense."'48 Under such a standard the Court would be able
to strike down a statute whenever it provided for punishment in excess
of what the double jeopardy clause defined to be the maximum sentence
mel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
44

Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEWS (98 Stat.) 1987 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 18 and 28
U.S.C.).
45

added).

Id. § 212, 98 Stat. at 2000 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b)) (emphasis

United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
See, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980);
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
48 Westen, supra note 14, at 1024; accord Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6,
11-13 (1978); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977) (plurality opinion).
48

47
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for the underlying offense.
This argument has since been repudiated by the Court. 49 Its major

weakness is that the Constitution does not contain a clear standard for
defining criminal offenses or for determining the maximum permissible
length of criminal sentences.5 0 By determining maximum sentences for
various criminal offenses, the courts would be intruding on the legislature's exclusive power to "define criminal offenses and to prescribe the
punishments to be imposed.""1
More recently the Supreme Court stated that the multiple punishment bar "is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts
is confined to the limits established by the legislature." 2 Under such a
standard a punishment becomes multiple when the court imposes a sentence in excess of what the legislature intended to authorize for a specific criminal act. For example, a sentencing court would violate the
multiple punishment protection if it imposed a sentence of twenty-five
years imprisonment for a particular offense when the statutory maximum sentence was twenty years.
The Supreme Court has left open the possibility of a broader
reading of the multiple punishment protection. In Whalen v. United
States53 the Court stated that the protection "at the very least precludes
federal courts from imposing consecutive sentences unless authorized by
Congress to do so."5' This invitation to interpret the protection more
broadly has been ignored by a number of courts of appeals. These
courts have stated that the prohibition of punishment in excess of the
statutory maximum is the only protection afforded the criminal defendant by the multiple punishment bar. 5
Lower courts have misperceived the proper scope of the multiple
punishment bar because the Supreme Court has not clearly identified
the values that inform the rule. To examine these values, it is helpful to
turn to the Court's first pronouncement of the rule, over a century ago,
"' See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980).

50 See Westen, supra note 14, at 1024-25. The eighth amendment prohibits the
state from imposing sentences that are "grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime," Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980), but outside of the context of
capital punishment "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences
have been extremely rare." Id. at 272.
t Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
52 Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2541 (1984).
53 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 180 (1984); United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632, 637 (11th Cir. 1983);

United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 951-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918

(1981).
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in Ex parte Lange:"
If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully
punished for the same offense. . . . [T]here has never been
any doubt of [this rule's] entire and complete protection of
the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same
57
court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offence.
The facts of Lange certainly did not forebode its seminal character. The defendant was convicted of appropriating mail bags for his
own use-a violation of federal law punishable by "imprisonment for
not more than one year or a fine of not . . . more than two hundred
dollars." 8 The judge,- apparently eager to stamp out this thievery, mis59
takenly sentenced Lange to one year in prison and a $200.00 fine.
The fine was promptly paid. After being shown his mistake the judge
vacated the prior sentence and resentenced Lange to a one-year imprisonment. 60 The Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the double
jeopardy clause to impose punishment again after the defendant had
already satisfied one of the authorized alternative punishments: "[T]he
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being
twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it." 1
The basic issue before the Court in Lange was a "question of the
power of courts over their judgments once rendered in criminal
cases.'82 This concern with judicial power was dearly expressed by the
Court when it spoke of the inability of the judge to resentence Lange:
"[T]he inexpediency of placing such a power in the hands of any tribunal is manifest." 3 Thus, the multiple punishment bar acted as a restriction upon judicial power. It barred the judge's abuse of power in
imposing additional punishment after the defendant had fully served an
authorized punishment for the offense.
But the protection against multiple punishment is concerned with
more than just restricting abuses of judicial power. The Court in Lange
also spoke of the double jeopardy "principle that no man shall more
than once be placed in peril of legal penalties upon the same accusa585 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
Id. at 168.
58Id. at 164.
11

19 See id.
60 See id.
I Id. at 173.
82 Id.
63

Id.

at 166.

at 168.
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tion." Thus, the multiple punishment protection also values the defendant's interest in finality-the interest in not being subject to the
"ordeal and . . . anxiety and insecurity" '

of a second sentencing

proceeding.
The Lange opinion hence evidenced two primary concerns that inform the rule barring multiple punishment. First, the Court was concerned with abuses of judicial power in sentencing. Second, the Court
was concerned with the defendant's interest in finality.
Despite the references in Lange to the constitutional values being
furthered by the multiple punishment bar, the scope of the opinion is
unclear. The sentencing judge in Lange attempted to impose punishment greater than the maximum authorized by statute. 6 Such an illegal sentence was a clear abuse of judicial power. It can therefore easily
be argued that Lange stands only for the proposition that the multiple
punishment doctrine bars punishment in excess of that permitted by
law.67 If the multiple punishment doctrine does no more than bar these
illegally excessive sentences, then resentencing defendants to harsher
penalties would not implicate the prohibition of multiple punishment.
The double jeopardy clause would merely require that the judge keep
the substitute sentence within statutory guidelines. The question thus
becomes whether punishment may be "multiple" even though the sentence is within legislated limits.
As one commentator stated, "One cannot know whether a defendant is being punished twice without knowing whether he has yet been
fully punished once, and one cannot know whether a defendant has
been punished once without identifying the law that governs sentences
for particular conduct."68 A legislature clearly may authorize punishment of imprisonment, fine, and public service for a single criminal
offense without it being deemed "multiple" punishment under the Constitution. Such a sentencing provision would be within the legislature's
exclusive power to "prescribe crimes and determine punishments."6 9 A
judge would not be restricted by the multiple punishment bar from imposing a sentence pursuant to such a statute.7 0
4

Id. at 173 (emphasis added).

65 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).

" See Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175.
17

See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980). For instance, if

Congress had made the theft of mail bags punishable by both a fine and a prison term,
then the defendant in Lange would have been unable to complain about the original
sentence on multiple punishment grounds.
68 Westen, supra note 14, at 1024.
69 Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2541 (1984).
70 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980).
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Yet the multiple punishment bar would be rendered meaningless
by a reading that it protects only against the imposition of sentences in
excess of legislated limits. The bar would amount to no more than a
test of the statutory legality of the sentence. The Supreme Court would
not review multiple punishment claims involving state prosecutions because the construction of a state statute by the state's highest court is
not subject to review." In addition, even in cases involving federal law
there would be no need for the Court to reach the constitutional issue
of multiple punishment: such decisions could be based purely on statutory construction. " Given the Supreme Court's penchant for avoiding
constitutional questions when a decision may be rendered on other
grounds,"3 the multiple punishment bar would thus seem doomed to
extinction. It is therefore difficult to imagine how a constitutional protection that has endured for over a century would merely provide the
unexceptional rule that a judge cannot impose a sentence beyond legislated limits.
In an attempt to give the multiple punishment bar some real force,
Professor Westen argues that it should act as a "presumption against
finding that domestic law intends multiple offenses and multiple punishment, a presumption that can be overcome only by 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that the domestic law intends offenses and sentences
to be cumulated." 7 4 Under Westen's view, even if a particular criminal

act arguably constitutes more than one criminal offense, the multiple
punishment bar would require that the sentencing judge presume that
the legislature intended the act to constitute only one offense and authorize only one sentence. The multiple punishment bar would thus
become a constitutional rule of statutory construction. This view finds
support in recent Court opinions that require a clear showing of contrary legislative intent before cumulative punishment is allowed. 5 The
sentiments behind such a rule are already evidenced by the Court's presumption of lenity in construing criminal laws 6-that is, a defendant
71 See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 689 (1975); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 631
(1875); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 747 (4th ed.

1983).
72 See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 696 (1980) (White, J., concurring);
id. at 702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73 See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1978); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 549 (1974); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
74 Westen, supra note 14, at 1026 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770, 791 (1975)).
75 See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983); Whalen v. United States,

445 U.S. 684, 695 (1980).
71

See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
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should be punished only to the extent that the punishment is unambiguously authorized by the legislature.
Westen's reading of multiple punishment protections is too restrictive. If one followed his presumption rule, resentencing defendants to
harsher penalties on the remaining counts would not implicate the prohibition of multiple punishment any more than if the prohibition
merely barred illegally excessive sentences. It would require only that
the judge keep the substitute sentence within statutory guidelines. Westen believes that this is the only formulation of the multiple punishment
rule that will give the protection some real force without unduly intruding upon the legislature's exclusive power to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishment." The Supreme Court is also fearful

of constructing the rule so as to tread too deeply into this area of "legislative prerogative." 78
This analysis loses sight of the values that inform the multiple
punishment bar. It is clear from Lange that the protection against multiple punishment was born not so much from a suspicion of legislative
power but from a suspicion of judicial power. 9 Congress could have
authorized both imprisonment and a fine in Lange-the point is that it
did not and that the judge exceeded his authority in attempting to impose both penalties.
In order to serve the purposes of the multiple punishment bar, one
does not need to construct a rule that would intrude on the legislature's
prerogative to prescribe punishment for particular offenses. Rather, the
multiple punishment rule may be fashioned to act as both a protection
against abuses of judicial power in sentencing and a protection of the
defendant's interest in finality.
In the context of resentencing, the judicial abuse feared is vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked part of a
multicount conviction. Such vindictiveness must not play a part in the
newly increased sentences on the valid counts.80 The Supreme Court
has noted that "[tihe existence of a retaliatory motivation would
7

See Westen, supra note 14, at 1027.

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (involving eighth amendment
challenge to sentence).
"I This concern with judicial power is also found in the rule that the authority to
impose punishment is granted wholly by statute-"[f]or, if judgments were to be the
private opinions of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates .... ." 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *371. These worries, when coupled with the defen78

dant's interest in finality, were at least partly responsible for the common-law rule that
a trial court could not increase an earlier imposed legal sentence. See 4 WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 611 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1976).
"0 In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the Court held that vindictive sentencing was a violation of the due process clause. See id. at 725.
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be extremely difficult to prove in any individual case,"'" but that vindictive sentencing can be prevented by requiring that any increase in
punishment be based on "objective information concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the
82
original sentencing proceeding.
When a defendant is being resentenced, however, there is unlikely
to be any new "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on
the part of the defendant" that a sentencing judge can point to as a
rationale for increasing the original sentence. The new sentence is imposed by the same judge based on the trial record for the same criminal
offense.8 3 Thus, the judge must point to her own subjective intent in the
initial sentencing proceeding as a rationale for increasing the sentence.
The judge must argue that she mistakenly placed "low" sentences on
the remaining counts of conviction under the belief that the original
aggregate sentence would be served. Although such an explanation is
certainly plausible, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. There does
not appear to be any way to protect against vindictive sentencing in this
context short of barring increases in sentences altogether.
A multiple punishment rule that protects defendants from the possibility of vindictive sentencing and protects their finality interests
would therefore bar subsequent increases in final legal sentences when
the underlying conviction is undisturbed. This rule would require
merely that a sentencing judge be bound by her initial sentencing decision. It assumes that the court will initially impose punishment that it
deems commensurate with the criminal liability of the defendant on the
particular offenses of conviction. Thus, the final legal sentence imposed
by a judge would establish a judicial maximum-any increase of the
sentence by the same court for the same offense would constitute multiple punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause.
The requirement that the original sentence be final and legal acknowledges the legislature's power to authorize various sentences and
sentencing procedures without contravening the multiple punishment
bar. Thus, if the initial sentence is illegal because it is lower than the
statutory minimum, the bar would not prohibit the correction of the
sentence even though the sentence is increased-such an increase is required as a matter of law, not as a matter of judicial discretion. In
addition, if Congress has specifically provided for governmental appeal
"1Id. at 725 n.20.
Id. at 726.
" See United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 950 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.

82

918 (1981).
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84 then the initial
of a sentence, as in United States v. DiFrancesco,
sentence is not final, and the bar does not prohibit a subsequent
increase.

B.

Supreme Court Support for a Rule Barring Enhanced
Punishment on Remand

A bar on increasing legal sentences on remand also finds support
in the dictum of a number of Supreme Court opinions. In United States
v. Benz8 5 the Court held that a court has the power to reduce a sentence imposed earlier in the same judicial term. The Court explained
that
[t]he distinction that the court during the same term may
amend a sentence so as to mitigate the punishment, but not
so as to increase it, is . . .based . . .upon the ground that

to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double
punishment for the same offense in violation of the [double
jeopardy clause] . ...

8

In Reid v. Covert"' the Court acknowledged its earlier holding "that
the President or commanding officer had power to return a case to a
court-martial for an increase in sentence. ' 88 The Court added, however, that "[i]f the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment
were applicable such a practice would be unconstitutional." 89 Finally,
Justice Rehnquist, who placed himself with the majority in
DiFrancesco,stated in his dissent in Whalen that the double jeopardy
clause "prevents a sentencing court from increasing a defendant's sentence for any particular statutory offense, even though the second sentence is within the limits set by the legislature." 0 These statements,
along with the Lange decision, led to the general belief prior to
DiFrancesco that enhancing punishment following the imposition of
valid final sentences was prohibited by the multiple punishment bar."1
In DiFrancesco the Court was faced with the question whether
Congress could specifically authorize an appeal of a sentence by the
government without violating the double jeopardy clause.9 2 The
449 U.S. 117 (1980).
85 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
84

88

Id. at 307.

354 U.S. 1 (1957).
88 Id. at 37 n.68 (citation omitted).
87
8"

Id. (citation omitted).

90 445 U.S. at 703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
9' See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
92 See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 120-21.
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DiFrancesco Court quickly rid itself of the multiple punishment claim.
It asserted that the multiple punishment bar protects a defendant
against receiving a greater sentence than the legislature has authorized.9 3 Since Congress had expressly authorized the governmental appeal of the sentence in DiFrancesco, however, the guarantee against
multiple punishment was not violated.9 4 The Court stated that the statute creating the government's right to appeal the initial sentence "establish[es] at the most a two-stage sentencing procedure."9 5 Thus, the
sentence was not considered final until after the sentence had been reviewed on appeal or the time for appeal had expired.9" This led the
Court to state that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of final97
ity when a statute provided for a later increase in his sentence.
Yet the simple conclusion in DiFrancescothat the multiple punishment bar was not violated does not apply in the multiple punishment
analysis of enhancing final legal sentences on remand. No similar statute exists to authorize the subsequent increase in punishment.9" Hence,
" See id. at 139.

94 See id.

9 Id. at 140 n.16.
98 The Court noted that "the original bill introduced in Congress specifically
stated that the sentence was not to be considered final until the disposition of review or
until the expiration of the time for appeal." Id.
" See id. at 137, 139. Two courts of appeals have focused on this language as the
DiFrancesco holding. In United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632 (11th Cir. 1983), the
court stated that, when the original sentence is legal and the statute does not provide for
appellate review, the defendant's expectations of finality are legitimate and the double
jeopardy clause bars a later increase in sentence. Id. at 638-39. The Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Wingender, 711 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1983), also seemed to limit
DiFrancescoto situations in which the defendant's expectations are not legitimate, such
as those involving an obviously erroneous original sentence. In Wingender the defendant was sentenced to a term to run consecutively with his state sentence. In fact there
was no state sentence, only a previous federal sentence. The court held that correcting
the obvious error did not violate the double jeopardy clause. See id. at 870-71.
11 See United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc). If
such a statute did exist, it could be argued that Congress, as opposed to the courts,
could constitutionally allow for resentencing on the remaining counts of a multicount
conviction. Such a result would seem to follow from the DiFrancesco Court's broad
endorsement of the power of a legislature to authorize a subsequent increase of a legal
sentence. There are three responses to this argument. First, it must be noted that the
statute upheld in DiFrancesco authorized punishment that was "clear and specific,"
449 U.S. at 139 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3576 (1982)), and allowed for governmental
appeal only when the original sentence was "clearly erroneous" or constituted an abuse
of discretion, 449 U.S. at 120 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982)). It is doubtful
that a blanket congressional approval of resentencing on remand would be read as a
"clear and specific" remedy for a "clearly erroneous" initial sentence.
Second, the DiFrancesco opinion rests on the view that a defendant's interest in
finality is not harmed if the defendant knows that the sentence is not final until the
deadline for governmental appeal has passed. If the government wishes to appeal a
sentence of a dangerous special offender, it must do so "at least five days before expiration of the time for taking a review . . . by the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1982),
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the sentences in the resentencing cases are final-they were not made
subject to later increase by a specific statute. At least three Justices
agree that the DiFrancesco analysis is limited to the situation in which
Congress has expressly authorized an increase in sentence. 99
In reaching its decision in DiFrancesco, the Court did not proceed
with an analysis of the specific purposes of the multiple punishment
bar, but such an analysis aids in explaining the decision and in distinguishing it from a situation in which a defendant is resentenced on
remand. First, there is little or no fear of an abuse of judicial power
when the increased sentence follows an appeal by the government that
has been expressly authorized by statute. Unlike the situation in resentencing, the defendant is being sentenced by a new court and has not
committed any act that would provoke vindictiveness.
Second, when the legislature has provided for a subsequent increase in the initial sentence, the defendant's finality interest is not injured as greatly as in a resentencing situation in which no such increase
in sentence has been authorized by statute. In this sense the statute has
quoted in DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 120 n.2. Even if one accepts the Court's view that
the interests of a dangerous special offender in finality are not harmed by section 3576,
it is not difficult to distinguish the interests of a defendant in the resentencing context.
If Congress allowed for resentencing following reversal of some counts of a multicount
conviction, it could be years before all appeals were exhausted and the defendant assured that the initial sentence would not be increased. DiFrancescodoes not foreclose
the possibility that a court would strike down a statute that resulted in years, rather
than days, of anxiety.
Third, congressional approval of resentencing does not remove the danger of judicial vindictiveness. Whether a trial judge is permitted to resentence based on a judicial
rule or a statute, there is a very real danger that the sentence will be increased in
retaliation for the defendant's successful appeal of the other counts. Such vindictiveness
is a violation of the due process clause. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
Even though an increased sentence on remand is not necessarily vindictive, a statute
permitting resentencing may violate the multiple punishment bar due to the danger of
vindictive sentencing coupled with the harm to the defendant's interest in finality.
99 See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 224 n.3 (1981) (Stevens, Brennan &
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). The present membership of the Court might well have
decided DiFrancesco differently. The retirement of Justice Stewart, who joined the
DiFrancescoopinion, leaves four justices on the present Court who joined in the opinion and four who dissented. Justice O'Connor, the new member of the court, has already expressed her view of the limitations of DiFrancesco.See id.
In addition, the statute involved in DiFrancescoprovided for the review of a sentence only to the- extent that it was "clearly erroneous" or constituted an abuse of
discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3756 (1982), quoted in DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 120 n.2.
"A sentence which is the product of an 'abuse of discretion' under prevailing legislative
standards is as unlawful as a sentence which violates the explicit terms of a sentencing
statute." Westen, supra note 14, at 1044 n.157. Thus, the DiFrancesco Court could
have simply followed Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), in which the Court
held that the correction of an illegal sentence does not violate the multiple punishment
bar. See id. at 166-67. In DiFrancesco the sentence was unlawful as applied to the
particular case, while in Bozza the sentence was illegal on its face. The Court did not
choose this route, however.
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conditioned the defendant's expectations of finality. Thus, looking to
the purposes of the multiple punishment protection, it is evident that
DiFrancesco does not provide the same multiple punishment problems
as when a defendant is being resentenced following the successful appeal of certain counts.
The decisions in North Carolinav. Pearce'0 0 and Bozza v. United
States'' are also consistent with the rule against increasing legal
sentences on remand when the underlying conviction remains intact. In
Pearce the Court held that a defendant whose conviction was overturned for trial error may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment following reconviction that is longer than the term imposed following the
initial conviction. 10 2 The Court rested its view "upon the premise that
the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean."103
Thus, a reconvicted defendant cannot point to her initial sentence
and successfully claim a violation of the multiple punishment rule, because the Court refuses to acknowledge that the initial conviction and
sentence ever existed. Perhaps it seems a bit absurd to accept this judicial fiction, but the fiction does have a purpose: the defendant should
not be allowed to claim in the same breath that the initial conviction
was tainted by trial error but that the initial sentence from this tainted
trial should nonetheless act as a ceiling. A conviction and sentence necessarily stand and fall together-it is incongruous to argue one should
be maintained while the other is overturned. Defendants may be seen
as forfeiting their rights to have the court treat the initial sentence as a
ceiling if they successfully appeal the initial conviction.' 0 4
The decision in Bozza v. United States virtually mimics Pearce
from the perspective of the protection against multiple punishment. In
Bozza the trial court mistakenly imposed a sentence of imprisonment
on the operator of a still when the applicable statute required a sentence of imprisonment and a fine.1 0 5 The trial court later corrected its
mistake, and the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not twice
put in jeopardy. 0 6 The Court in Bozza stated that "[t]he Constitution
does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong
move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.' 07 Doubtless the
100 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
101 330
102 See
103
104

105

Id. at 721.
See Westen, supra note 14, at 1059-60.
See Bozza, 330 U.S. at 165.

106 See
107

U.S. 160 (1947).
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720.

id. at 167.

See id. at 166-67 (citation omitted).

1428

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:1409

defendant was not in a gaming mood either when he challenged the
sentence. Again, however, the Court viewed the initial unauthorized
sentence as a legal nullity. One cannot argue double punishment when
the Court refuses to recognize that there has been any punishment at
all.' 0 8 The rule against increasing legal sentences when the initial conviction stands thus survives Bozza as well; the rule is concerned with
initial sentences that are within statutory guidelines and thus cannot be
considered legal nullities.
It is questionable, however, whether the multiple punishment protection of the defendant's interest in finality should be so flimsy that it
cannot withstand the judicial fiction of Pearceand Bozza that the prior
convictions and sentences never existed. The initial convictions and
sentences certainly existed from the defendant's perspective. A defendant would see little difference between a situation in which an invalid
sentence was imposed and later corrected and a situation in which a
legal sentence has been imposed and later increased on remand. In both
settings the original sentence has been increased, and the defendant's
interest in finality has been violated.
This argument appears to be the rationale used by one commentator, who stated that "there is no substantive basis for distinguishing on
multiple punishment grounds between the increase of a valid sentence . . .and the increase of an invalid sentence . .

.

.[I]n both in-

stances the punishment initially imposed has been increased . ...09
But there are a number of practical reasons why the multiple punishment bar should treat these situations differently. The reasons become
evident when one weighs the interests of the parties involved.
C.

Weighing the Interests in Resentencing

As the DiFrancescoand Lange opinions show, the multiple punishment protection of the criminal defendant's interest in finality is not
absolute-but neither is it nonexistent. To determine whether an alteration of a sentence should be barred by the multiple punishment rule it
is useful to weigh the interests of the state against the interests of the
defendant. The balancing of interests is not new for the Court in the
.0.Accord United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he

imposition of the initial sentence exceeded the court's statutory authority and was
therefore a legal nullity.") (citation omitted).
109 Stern, Government Appeals of Sentences: A ConstitutionalResponse to Arbitrary and Unreasonable Sentences, 18 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 51, 74 (1980) (footnotes
omitted), quoted in United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 951 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 918 (1981).
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context of double jeopardy.' As the Court noted in Burks v. United
States,' the defendant's interest in finality must be balanced against
"society'[s] . . . valid concern for insuring that the guilty are
11 2
punished.1
In the area of resentencing, the interest of the defendant is an interest in finality-a desire to have the ordeal of sentencing over once
and for all and avoid the strain of uncertainty and delay. The defendant's interest is satisfied if, once a sentence is imposed, it may not later
be increased.
The state has an interest in insuring that proper punishment is
imposed for a particular offense and defendant. In the context of resentencing, there is no danger that the convicted defendant will go unpunished, since valid sentences are in force on the remaining counts and
will be served regardless of whether resentencing is allowed. The state's
interest thus involves a desire to avoid lenient sentences, not simply a
desire to punish the guilty. A sentence on a particular count is "lenient" whenever the trial court would have imposed a greater sentence if
it had known that other counts and sentences would be reversed on
appeal.
The state also has an interest in keeping retaliatory motivations
from playing a part in the sentence a criminal defendant receives. The
defendant, of course, shares this interest in avoiding vindictive sentencing. The state's interest is actually another aspect of its desire to have a
proper sentence imposed-an overly harsh, vindictive sentence is no
better in this respect than a lenient sentence.
Before considering the balance of interests of the state and the defendant in the area of resentencing, it is helpful to examine the facts
and interests in the Court's decisions regarding other alterations of initial sentences. In Lange the Court struck down an attempt by the sentencing judge to impose a new sentence after an authorized punishment
for the offense had been fully served. 1 ' In Bozza the Court held that
an illegal sentence may be corrected even if the new sentence is harsher
than the original sentence." 4 In Pearcethe Court held that a defendant
whose conviction was overturned for trial error was subject not only to
retrial but also to an increased sentence on retrial."' Finally, in
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91-94 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-05 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973);
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
1 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
122 Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
118 See Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168.
14 See Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-67.
15 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720.
110
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DiFrancesco the Court ruled that the government could appeal a sentencing decision pursuant to a specific federal statute granting it this
power.'1 "
In each of these cases the interests of the defendants were affected
in the same way. Each defendant desired to have the sentence that was
initially imposed become a ceiling-to avoid being placed once again in
peril of the statutory maximum. Yet only in Lange did the defendant's
interest gain the protection of the Constitution. Since the effects on the
defendants were so much alike, the dispositive factor in the balancing of
interests in these cases appears to be the interests of the state.
The interests of the state in these cases were certainly dissimilar.
Lange implicated the state's interest in preventing the imposition of illegal sentences. The new sentence imposed in Lange, if upheld, would
have punished the defendant in excess of the maximum sentence allowed by statute.1 1 7 Bozza involved the state's interest in preventing
illegal penalties and its interest in insuring that the guilty are punished. The latter interest was jeopardized because the defendant would
go free if he could not be resentenced."'
In Pearcethe Court noted that it followed from "[1]ong-established
constitutional doctrine" 1 9 that a court, following reversal of a conviction for trial error, could retry the defendant and impose a sentence
longer than the defendant originally received. 2 ° The interest of the
state in this instance was to allow the court to function as a court: that
is, to impose a sentence based on its perception of a fresh showing of
facts and a fresh conviction. Finally, in DiFrancescothe state's interest
was to fulfill the intent of Congress in establishing a "two-stage sentencing procedure."'' The DiFrancescoCourt showed its reluctance to
upset the intent of Congress by noting that the double jeopardy clause
had never been used to invalidate an act of Congress. 2
In the context of resentencing, the interest of the defendant is the
same interest in finality as is found in these sentencing alteration cases.
Again the defendant has an interest in being placed in peril of the maximum sentence only once for a particular offense. This interest is violated even if the sentencing judge decides not to increase the original
sentence. It is the resentencing process that violates the defendant's finality interest, not merely the resulting increased punishment.
"I See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137-39.
See Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 175.
11 See Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-67.
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 719.
120 See id. at 719-20.
121 DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 140 n.16.
122 See id. at 126.
117
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In turning to the weight of the interests of the state in resentencing
to harsher punishment, it must first be remembered that the initial sentence is legal and that the underlying conviction has not been disturbed.
As stated earlier, the state's interest under these circumstances is to
avoid both lenient and vindictive sentences. The Pearce rationale does
not apply in this setting, since resentencing does not involve a new trial
with a fresh state of facts and a fresh conviction, which would warrant
the corollary power to sentence to any lawful punishment. Also, unlike
DiFrancesco, there is no statute expressing the legislature's desire to
redefine finality. Finally, Bozza does not apply, since there is no illegal
sentence to correct, and since the defendant will be punished even without a new sentence.
The state merely wishes to correct any possible mistake the judge
may have made in sentencing. Its argument is simple. The judge could
have initially imposed longer sentences on the remaining counts and
stayed within statutory guidelines. Resentencing allows the judge to reapportion the original aggregate sentence to conform to her initial intentions. 123 But this reapportionment comes at the cost of violating the
defendant's finality interest and risking the possibility of vindictive sentencing. In addition, such a sentencing "mistake" could generally be
avoided altogether by attaching sentences on the particular counts with
a view to the gravity of that particular count and by adjusting the aggregate punishment by having some sentences run concurrently and
some consecutively.12
120 One commentator has suggested that a rule barring resentencing "may produce
extremely arbitrary sentencing outcomes." Stern, supra note 109, at 76.
124 The problem and proper solution can best be seen in the context of an actual
case. In United States v. Sales, 725 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1984), the defendant was convicted of ten separate counts of receiving stolen postal money orders and sentenced to
"one year on count one, two years on count two, three years on count three, and so
forth, through count ten, the sentences to run consecutively." Id. at 460. The total
sentence was thus fifty-five years. The unusually harsh sentence for receiving stolen
property may have been motivated by the trial judge's desire to punish the defendant
for not plea bargaining. See id. at 460 & n.2. On appeal the Eighth Circuit held that
the evidence was insufficient to show more than one illegal receipt of the money orders
and reversed all but the first count. Id. at 460.
Since the judge's sentencing plan had been changed from a 55-year sentence to a
one-year sentence, it is clear that he would have imposed a greater sentence on the first
count had he anticipated reversal of the other nine counts. Yet the judge's intent would
not have been thwarted had he attached sentences commensurate with the gravity of
each offense. Once the gravity of each offense has been established, a judge can adjust
the aggregate sentence to reflect the gravity of the transaction. For example, a defendant who receives 20 stolen postal money orders does not necessarily deserve a 200-year
sentence. By using concurrent and consecutive sentences a judge can attempt to take
into account the gravity of each offense as well as the gravity of the transaction. In this
case the judge could have sentenced the defendant to ten years on each count, five to
run consecutively and five to run concurrently, with a resulting 50-year term. After the
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Even when mistakenly lenient sentences cannot be avoided, to require that defendants sacrifice their interests in finality is to forsake a
greater interest for a lesser: "The possibility of abuses inherent in
broad judicial power to increase sentences outweighs the possibility of
'
windfalls to a few prisoners." 125
The defendant's constitutionally valued interest in finality and the state's interest in avoiding vindictiveness
together withstand the interest of the state in correcting "mistakenly"
1 26
lenient, albeit legal, sentences.
CONCLUSION

The double jeopardy clause protects criminal defendants' interests
in the finality of their sentences by prohibiting multiple punishments
for the same offense. This protection restricts the judiciary's power to
place a defendant twice in peril of the maximum legal penalty.
In order to avoid abuses of judicial power and respect the defendant's interest in finality, the multiple punishment bar must be read to
prohibit the increase of a final legal sentence when the underlying conviction is maintained. A criminal defendant who has successfully appealed certain counts of a multicount conviction cannot be subjected to
harsher sentences on the remaining counts without breaching the multiple punishment protection of the double jeopardy clause.

reversal of nine counts, the defendant would still serve the maximum 10-year term, and
there would be no need for resentencing. If the judge believed that receipt of a stolen
money order warranted the maximum allowable sentence, his intent would be fulfilled
despite the reversal of the other nine counts.
Of course, a judge will not always be able to construct a sentencing scheme that
takes into account the gravity of each offense, the gravity of the transaction, and the
effects on his sentencing scheme of a reversal of some of the counts. The purpose of this
example is to illustrate that mistakenly lenient sentences can often be avoided by the
proper use of concurrent and consecutive sentences.
"'5 United States v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1966); see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 731 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The risk of judicial
arbitrariness rests where . . .the Constitution puts it-on the Government.") (citation
omitted).
126 The American Bar Association's Standardsfor Criminal Justice also state
that the power to increase a legal sentence would be "undesirable." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-7.1 commentary at 504 (1980). "Any such power would
likely increase prisoner anxiety, [and] there would always be the possibility that such
power would be misused . . ." Id.; see also id. § 18-4.9 (no increased sentences
should be allowed in resentencing except in DiFrancesco situations).

